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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
K J SCHARF, dba WESTERN
LEASING,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 18963

vs.
BMG CORPORATION, VERNON R
ERICKSON, MICHAEL R. ERICKSON,
and BRUCE V. ERICKSON,
Defendants.
VERNON R. ERICKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This

is

repossession

an
and

action
sale

of

to

recover

two

a

machines

deficiency
that

had

judgment
been

after

leased

to

BMG Corporation under two separate lease agreements, both of which
had been guaranteed by Vernon R. Erickson, Michael R. Erickson, and
Bruce V. Erickson
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COllRT
At the commencement of trial, on plaintiff's motion
dismissed

as

against

BMG Corporat10n,

Bruce V.

Michael R. Erickson, and proceeded against Vernon R
Honorable David B. Dee, without a jury.

the

;;1·t1on '""'

F.nckson,

and

Erickson before

The court entered judgment

against Vernon R. Erickson for $57, 810 21 plus costs

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment, and the award of an
attorney's fee for services in connection with the appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent

agrees

with

"Statement of Material Facts"

the

first

paragraph

of

appellant's

but does not agree with the remaining

paragraphs or with the statement as a whole because of the omission of
much material evidence.

In paragraph 2, page 2, of his brief, appellant quotes a portion of
a

demand

letter from

Miss Scharf,

dba

Western

Leasing,

which

is

intended to create the impression, and support argument on page 10 of
the brief, that Miss Scharf had a total lack of concern for the amount
to be received upon sale of the equipment
letter (Exhibit 3) gives an opposite impression

- 2 -

A reading of the entire

Dear Mr. Erickson.
With reference to our
letter is to inform you
guaranteed are now in
the enclosed statements

telephone conversation last week, this
that the above leases which you have
default, and we must ask you to bring
current.

As we discussed with you, the machinery is being picked up
and is bemg advertised for sale. We are willing _1£ wait for
the best offer we feel we can
_1£ sell the equipment;
however, we have !£ make
all Qf the back payments _1£ the
bank and cannot afford _1£ do so
longer.
Therefore, we must ask you to make substantial reductions of
the balances due on both leases; this will give us some time
to look for the highest possible bids for sale Qf the
equipment. If a payment is not received in our office before
April 30, 1980, we will be forced to sell the equipment as
quickly as possible for what ever we can get and ask you to
make up any deficiencies on the balances of the leases.
[Emphasis added.]
The next paragraph of the brief states that after repossession of
the equipment, Western Leasing "published an advertisement" to sell the
equipment.
that

The statement is true but bare-boned.

Western

Leasing

published

advertisements

The testimony was
in

the

Salt

Lake

Tribune, the Deseret News, and the Ogden Standard Examiner, and ran
them

for

three

weeks

in

each

(R.

114-115).

(Exhibit 5) read as follows:
TAKE OVER LEASE PAYMENTS
OR MAKE OFFER ON
1)

2)

3)
4)

Summit Hydraulic Shear
Victor Lathe 16" by 60"
Model XL Hyd. Iron Worker
Enterprise Model L-2 Lathe
ALL IN EXCELLENT CONDITION

Call 295-2412

- 3 -

The

advertisements

40a

This advertisement appeared

in

the

classlf1ed sect Jon under

the

heading "Machinery . Pipe, Tools "

Appellant is correct in pointing out that the machinery was in good
condition at the time of sale, but neglected to mention that some of the
dies

were

three-jaw

missing
chuck

accessories

were

from

and

the

a

shear

four-jaw

missing

from

(R.

121);

and

chuck),

a

taper

lathe

( R.

120,

the

two

chucks

attachment,
138)

(a
and

Although

Miss Scharf testified that the useful life of the equipment would be
30 years

if it

were

properly

cared

for

and maintained,

appellant's

expert witness testified that the useful life for both the Victor Lathe
and the Summit Shear was about ten years (R. 195).

Appellant correctly states that the lathe was purchased new for
$18, 000

in the summer of

1979;

he does

not mention that although

Miss Scharf paid for a 24 x 60-inch lathe, BMG Corporation, by some
arrangement with the seller, Tan-Dem Machinery, agreed to accept a
much

less

expensive

16

x

60-inch

lathe,

apparently

for

some

consideration back from Tan-Dem Machinery (R. 141, 142, 145).

Appellant

correctly

points out that a

"written appraisal by an

independent, qualified appraiser" was not obtained by Western Leasing,
he

fails

to

independently

mention
by

two

that

Miss Scharf

qualifed

persons

had

the

who

were

Summit brand shears and Victor brand lathes

- 4 -

(R

equipment
familiar

priced

with

the

125-127), and that

<±Oa

the appraisal for the shear was $18 ,500 and the appraisal for the lathe
was

(R

$5, 255.
118),

The shear was sold for $19 ,000 and the lathe for $6 ,000
which

were

the

highest offers received (R.

119).

The

appellant stresses evidence of its expert witness that the equipment
"would have a minimum fair market value of at least 80% of the purchase
price" (R.

193-199), but the testimony of that witness, Peter Robert

Grisley, was not that clear and was of doubtful validity.

He said he

would value machinery of this type at 80% of its "market value" and
that would be the lowest that his company would sell it for (R. 199).
The 80% to which he referred is what his company would buy equipment
for (R. 203) but his company would not buy a used piece of equipment
such as the Victor Lathe (R. 204).

The witness had had no experience

in buying or selling Victor Lathes or Summit Shears, had not seen any
of the equipment before testifying, did not know the selling price of a
16 x 60-inch Victor Lathe, and had never seen a price list for either it
or a 24 x 60-inch lathe made by Victor (R. 206-207).

In all, the appellant has referred almost exclusively to evidence
that he considers helpful to his case.
facts

bearing

upon

the

Set out below are some additional

adequacy of the notice and the commercial

reasonableness of the sale as presented to the trial judge.

Miss Scharf

made

payment program with
1980,

serious

attempts

the Ericksons (R.

to

work

107).

out

type

of

Commencing in May

she had numerous conversations with appellant.

- 5 -

some

She told him

40a

that the sons were going to leave the equipment at T;in-!Jem Mdchrn<·n·
where the machines would be under powf'r and prospect1vP buyers could
come in, run the machines, and see how well they performed and the
kind of condition they were in, also that his sons were going to attempt
to

sell the

machines

(R.

110).

In

August

she

talked

to

Vernon

Erickson and his sons about picking up the machinery, moving it to a
different

location,

doing

equipment (R. 111)

the

advertising,

and

disposing

of

the

Following this she placed the newspaper ads, she

distributed flyers; she notified some of the dealers that she had dealt
with in Salt Lake City, Denver, and Albuquerque that the machinery
was available for sale; she contacted several of her customers in the
machine tool industry, sellers of such equipment, to notify them that
she had equipment for sale.
Products,

Rosskelley

Supply,

In Salt Lake City she contacted Neway
and

Machinery had already been notified.
Leonard Company;

and in

Vitus Cranberg (R. 112).
remembers

interest

Manufacturing,

R

Machine

Tool.

Tan-Dem

In Denver she contacted F

Albuquerque she contacted an

J.

individual,

She contacted various of her customers and

being

& B

Utah

shown

Fabrication,

by
Jacobs

Stamping Company, and Utah Tool and Die.

Atwood

Stamping,

Machinery,

Arc

International

It was her practice in this

type of situation to con tact each one of her customers ( R. 114-115).

As a result of the newpaper advertising,

she received telephone

calls from various individuals indicating they would like to look at the
equipment.

She would go with them to look at the equipment or

- 6 -
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Jrrange ( R.
equipment

115) for someone to be there so they could inspect the

and

look

at

it.

Several people inspected the machinery

without ever making an offer on it.
and some written offers.

She received some verbal offers

During normal business hours someone was

there to show the machinery, and if the potential purchasers wanted to
come after work or on a weekend, plaintiff would make arrangements to
meet them so they could see the machinery (R. 116).

Machinery of this

kind is often sold through machinery dealers and through newspaper
advertising.
the

Frequently, lessors place the machinery with a dealer in

area and

give

him

responsibility

for

selling it

(R.

119),

but

plaintiff took an active part in this case because dealers customarily
charge a 10% commission, and by eliminating the dealer she would be
able to obtain a higher net return (R. 120).

Absence of the chucks, taper attachment, and other accessories
substantially limited plaintiff's ability to sell the lathe.
trying to sell a car without wheels."
not produce any parts,

"It was like

Without a chuck, the machine will

and before it could be used the purchaser

would have to buy a chuck and the attachments.

The price received

was a reasonable one, probably even higher than someone else would
have received under other circumstances, because the purchaser had
another machine with the same type of tooling, could use the tooling for
both

machines,

BMG lathe
represented

(R
its

and
121).

would
The

reasonable

not

have

price

at

to

buy

which

more
the

value or market value.
- 7 -

tooling for
shear

was

the
sold

Smaller machine

40a

shops and fabricating- companies

are

the ones who

m

s,·hdl'f'o

experience, were generally most IJkely to be mterested rn huvrng ns<'d
equipment of the
machinery

were

type involved
for

the

most

The people who made bids on the
part people

who

would be using

the

machines in their normal course of business; they were not people who
would be likely to resell the equipment (R. 122)

She
because

didn't attempt to hold a
an

auctioneer

usually

public auction for the machinery

charges

a

high

premium

further reduces the arnoun t recoverable for the machine.

which only
She notified

people in the industry to find out if they were interested in buying the
machine or if they were aware of anyone else interested in buying them
(R.

134).

She

talked

to

several

purchasing

agents

from

local

manufacturing companies and she gave notice of availability in the form
of flyers as well as by the newspaper advertising.

The letter of September 11, 1980, was not the only notice given to
appellant.

She

also

contacted

him

by

telephone

( R.

132).

On

September 30 she called him and told him that Tan-Dern Machinery had
made the highest bid of $17 ,000 and that she was willing to accept that
because it appeared to be the highest bid she could obtain.
appellant

said,

"Fine."

Nothing

was

done

by

In reply

BMG or any of the

Ericksons to delay the sale or obtain a higher price for the equipment.

- 8 -

The

tnal

judge,

after

considering all

of

the

evidence,

made

Fmdmgs of Fact and Conclusions of Law, among them the following:
6.
On or about September 11, 1980, plaintiff made
written demand upon BMG Corporation and the Ericksons for
full payment of the indebtedness due under the leases.
Plaintiff also informed them that failure to meet the demand
would result in the equipment being sold on September 30,
1980.
7.
Plaintiff promptly advertised the equipment for
three weeks in the Salt Lake Tribune, the Deseret News, and
the Ogden Examiner under the classified advertisement
heading, "Machinery , Pipe and Tools . " In addition, plain tiff
made several telephone calls to possible purchasers and asked
the Ericksons to try to find a buyer or lessee.
8.
From these efforts plaintiff received written bids
from nine potential purchasers, and several other oral bids
which were not confirmed and none of which were as high as
the price for which the equipment was sold.
9.
Plaintiff made herself available on a regular basis in
order to show potential purchasers the equipment.
10. During this period plain tiff continued to encourage
the Ericksons to find a buyer or lessee for the equipment.
Defendants failed to produce even one possible purchaser or
lessee for the equipment during this time.

***
13. The
prices
that plaintiff received from
the
respective sales of the equipment was the reasonable market
value for the equipment.

***
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
Plaintiff's written
1980, requiring defendants
indebtedness due under the
sold on September 30, 1980,
pursuant to § 70A-9-504(3),
wherein plaintiff was only
notification of the time after
made * * *·"

demand, dated September 11,
to make full payment of the
leases or to have the equipment
was sufficient notice as required
Utah Code Annotated (1980),
required to. give
which any private sale is to be

- 9 -
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2.
Plaintiff's sale ,,f thee prope>rty un <Jc-t.,1Je1 l, 1981),
and October 9, 1980. 1s m<·onse4uPnt1al given th;it the o:de
was a private sale pursuant to § 70A-9-50•i( :l). Utah (:uJc:
Annotated (1980)
3.
Plaintiff, as secured party, has met its burden
under the analysis set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in
Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc
v. Glaubenskee, 649 P 2d 28
(Utah 1982), of conducting a- commercially reasonable sale
pursuant to § 70A-9-504(3), Utah Code Annotated ( 1980)
4.
Defendants were not prejudiced by any inadequacies
of the notice because plaintiff made every reasonable effort to
conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner and
there was nothmg defendants could have done or would have
done to enhance the value of the equipment sold. Plaintiff
received the market value for the equipment sold. * * *
On the basis of the findings and conclusions,

the court entered

judgment against Vernon R. Erickson for $54,310.21 plus attorney's fees
of $3, 500 and costs.

ARGUMENT

WAS
CONDUCTED
THE
EQUIPMENT
SALE
OF
COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE MANNER.

IN

A

Under the provisions of 70A-9-504(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953,
sales of collateral must be commercially reasonable.

The section reads

as follows:
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private
proceedings and may be made by way of one or more
contracts.
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in
parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but
every aspect of the disposition including the method. manner.
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily
in value or is of a type customarily sold on <i recognized
- 10 -

market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any
public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which
any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made
shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has
not signed after default a statement renouncing or modifying
his right to notification of sale.
The secured party
may buy at any public sale and if the collateral is of a type
customarily sold in a recognized market or is of a type which
is the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations
he may buy at private sale.

***

The term "commercially reasonable" is not defined in the Code, and
appellant has attempted to impose standards that go far beyond those
that have been utilized by the courts.
must

use

"every effort"

advantage of time,

He says that the secured party

to sell the collateral under "every possible

place, method and manner in order to obtain the

highest realization possible."

He suggests that an independent written

appraisal must be obtained and professionals hired; that a seller must
not let possible buyers know that repossessed property is being sold;
and that, in this case, the secured party should have waited until 1984
to sell the equipment in the hope that at a later date, a better price
might be obtained.

Appellant even goes
commercially

reasonable

so far as to suggest that the examples of
sales

set

out

in

70A-9-507(2)

Utah

Code

Annotated 1953 are the only examples of commercially reasonable sales.
The section provides·
The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a
sale at a different time or in a different method from that
selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to
establish that the sale was not made in a commercially
reasonable manner.
If the secured party either sells the
- 11 -
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collateral

in

the

11suC1.l

111dnner

in

an\'

d

m,1rk1 1

therefor <>r if tie siclb at lhe price c'u1-i-ent in
m.JrkPt ;it
the time of h10 sale or if hce has othcerwise S<ilcJ 111 ,-,rnfor-m11 v
with reasonable commercial praL't1ceo dJTiong dealer-s ill the
type of property sold he has sold ill a commerc1aUy reasonable
manner.
The principles stated m the two precedillg
sentences with respect to sales also apply as may be
appropriate to other types of disposition
A disposition which
has been approved in any JUd1c1al proceeding or by any
bona fide creditor's committee or representative of creditors
shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially reasonable,
but this sentence does not indicate that any such approval
must be obtained in any case nor does it indicate that any
disposition not so approved is not commercially reasonable

Much of appellant's brief is devoted to the argument that a sale is
not commercially reasonable unless it is sold in one of the ways referred
to in the foregoing quotation.

The official Code comment does not take

that position.
In view of the remedies provided the debtor and other
creditors in subsection ( 1) when a secured party does not
dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, it is
of great importance to make clear what types of disposition
are to be considered commercially reasonable, and in an
appropriate case to give the secured party means of gettillg.
by court order or negotiation with a creditor's committee or a
representative of creditors, approval of a proposed method of
disposition as a commerically reasonable one.
Subsection ( 2)
states rules to assist in the determination, and provide for
such advance approval in appropriate situations
One
recognized method of disposing of repossessed collateral is for
the secured party to sell the collateral to or through a
dealer -- a method which in the long run may realize better
average returns since the secured party does not usually
maintain his own facilities for making such sales.
Such a
method
of
sale,
fairly
conducted,
is
recognized
as
commercially
reasonable
under
the
second sentence of
subsection ( 2).
However. none of the specific methods of
disposition set forth in subsection ( 2) 1s to be regarded as
either required or exclusive,
provided only that the
disposition made or about to be made by the securced party 10
commercially reasonable.

- 12 -
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In ouppon ,;f the argument that Western Leasing was obligated to
u:oe

professionals

in

National Bank '.l·

selling

the

property,

appellant

cites

Acme Tool Division, 540 F.2d 1375 (10 Cir.

Liberty
1976).

That case, however, involved a situation in which the secured party,
Liberty
rigs,

National Bank,

and

had had no experience in selling oil drilling

when it repossessed an oil rig its officers inquired and

investigated as to the usual manner of making such sales.

It was told

that the ordinary method for selling a drilling rig was to employ an
auctioneer to move the rig to a convenient location, clean it and paint
it, notify interested persons, and advertise the sale in trade journals
and newspapers.

The bank didn't do any of those things.

was neither cleaned, painted nor dismantled.

The rig

The bank did not move it

to a convenient site but sold it during a snowstorm at the place where
it had been.

The sale was conducted by one who had never conducted

an auction of an oil rig or any oil field equipment and lacked experience
in the oil business.

And the court was unfavorably impressed by the

fact that the bank had inquired as to the recognized methods for selling
an oil rig, but after weighing the situation made a decision not to follow
them.

The rig was sold for substantially less than what the court

found to be its value, and the evidence indicated that the bank was
interested

only

in

getting

enough

out of

the

oil

rig

to

pay

its

indebtedness although there were other security holders.

The appellant complains that the persons asked to make offers on
the equipment knew that it was a "distress sale."
- 13 -

It was not a distress

40a

offered

The persons with whom Miss Scharf de;ilt mu,1

have known

that she was looking for the best possible price for the equipment.
Appellant states, without any support from the record, that "potential
bidders concluded
entertained

by

that a bid less

the

lessor,"

and

than
with

fair market

value

similar

of

lack

would be

evidence

or

suggestion at the trial that "common knowledge dictates that one rarely
makes a bid on equipment being sold in a distress sale which closely
approximates
bidding

is

the

equipment's
In

competitive."

"competitive"

in

the

actual

sense

the

that

fair

market

present
more

case

than

one

value
the

unless

the

bidding

was

person

was

being

contacted for the showing of interest in purchase of the equipment but
was not competitive in the sense that it was a public auction.

At

page

six

of

that

his
a

brief,
private

appellant
sale

states

"must"

use

that

the

regular

drafter's

comments

state

commercial

channels,

and then quotes a comment to the effect that a particular

feature of the Code was designed to "encourage" disposition by private
sale through regular commercial channels.

There are only two types of sales contemplated by the Code, a
private sale and a public sale.
required

a

finding

that

the

The trial court found and the evidence
sale

in

this

case was

Appellant has attempted to put Miss Scharf m

a prl\'ate sale

an unpossible pusitiun

If she had not sought offers ("bids") from a large number of possible

- 14 -

lil:J

1•111·•.·h;1S<·rs, the argument would certainly have been made that the
f,1ilure to do so made the sale commercially unreasonable, but since he
could not legitimately do that,

he takes the position that because a

number of offers were sought, the private sale was somehow converted
into a public sale, and therefore the notice of the sale was not proper,
and the sale was not commercially reasonable because it did not follow
the format of other public sales,

In Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc, y_. Glaubensklee, 649 P, 2d 28, 30
(Utah 1982), the court distinguished between public sales and private
sales:

***

A public sale after default "has traditionally meant 'a
sale in which the public, upon proper notice, is invited to
participate and given full opportunity to bid upon a
competitive basis for the property placed on sale, which is
sold to the highest bidder,'"
The requirement of a
public invitation is essential for a public sale under the
Uniform Commercial Code.
It is fundamental that a
public sale presupposes posting public notices or advertising.
The Restatement of Security § 48 Comment (1941)
defines a public sale as "one to which the public is invited by
advertisement to appear and bid at auction for the goods to
be sold." [Citations omitted.]

***
* * *

* * *

There is no way the sale in this case could be considered to be a
public sale.

Appellant

also takes

the position,

without supporting evidence,

that if there had been competitive bidding,

"the price realized would

have approximated the fair market value of 80% (eighty percent) of the
purchase price."

Although the appellant's expert testified with respect
- 15 -

40a

to 80% of market \'alue. he never did define markt"I \·;l[u" , .r tw
the purchase price ot a new piece of equ1prnen t

Mor·eover

11

t"

the tnal

court was not required to accept the testimony of the person presented
to it as an expert,

particularly in light of the reasons given for his

opinions and the admissions
31 Am. Jur. 2d,

Expert

made by him in cross-examination

and

Federal-American Partners,

Opinion

Evidence,

§ 183,

See

Holly

v.

29 Utah2d 212, 507 P. 2d 381, 383 (1973)

Miss Scharf had been in the business of buying and leasing these
particular types of machines.
such

as

those

Approximately 70% of her business was in

machine

tools

involved in

this

case (R.

testified

that the prices obtained for the machine

100).

She

represented their

market value, and she also testified as to the appraisals obtained from
two knowledgeable equipment dealers,

which appraisals

were slightly

lower than the prices actually received for the equipment on its sale.

It has also been suggested by appellant that in order for the sale

to have been commercially reasonable, Miss Scharf should have delayed
the sale un ti! the end of the lease, hoping for a better price
such a burden on a secured party is not reasonable.

Placing

Lessor must pay

for the purchased property whether any income is being received from
it or not, and only lessors with great financial resources would be able
to continue business while following such a procedure

- 16 -

In
II

< 'onn

Hertz
Sup.

Commercial

Leasing

Corp.

v.

Dynatron,

Inc. ,

7, 427 A. 2d 875 ( 1980), one of the cases cited by the

appellant,

the court took the view that delaying a sale for 15 months

following

repossession

made

the

sale

commercially

unreasonable,

observing that "the substantial lapse of time obviously persuaded the
1978 buyer to make a reduced offer, because of the increased age of.
the machine, the additional depreciation thereof, for many months, and
other related factors, which would influence a buyer to lower his bid.
Unreasonable delay in the sale may produce a violation of § 9-504."

In summary, the standards set out by the appellant are his own.
Although appellant has found some language here and there from which
he

takes

solace,

the cases cited have not applied such standards.

Weiss v. Northwest Acceptance Corporation, 546 P. 2d 1065 (Ore. 1976),
with

respect

to

commercial

reasonableness,

dealt primarily with the

admissibility of evidence relating to the preparation of the goods for
sale and of demanding a cash or certified check, holding that evidence
with

respect

to

these

matters

was

relevant and

admissible on the

question of commercial reasonableness, but the court recognized that
the determination of what is commercially reasonable is a determination
left in the first instance to the trier of fact.

Community Management Association v. Tousely, 32 Colo.App. 33,
505 p 2d 1314 (1973), dealt with the provisions of § 9-504(3), Uniform
Commercial Code, dispensing with the requirement of reasonable
- 17 -

40a

notification

if

the

cuU;iter:ll

of

is

"

tvpe

·... \d

cu't"nL1r!l\'

"n

.1

recognized market

The

courts

have

generally

have

not

adopted

the standards as

espoused by Grant Gillmore, quoted on page 5 of appellant's brief, the
test of commercial reasonableness being somewhat more flexible

It has

been said that a secured party acts in a commercially reasonable manner
when, in process of disposing of repossessed security, he acts in good
faith and in accordance with commonly accepted commercial practices
which afford all parties fair treatment, Wilkerson Motor Co., Inc.
Johnson,

580 P.2d

505,

509

disposition

of

accomplish

disposition

to

Commercial

Leasing

Corp.

1978);

(Okl

collateral must

be

the

made

parties'
v.

in

and
a

that

good

the

qualifying

faith

attempt

mutual best advantage,

Dynatron,

Inc.

to

Hertz

37 Conn. Sup.

7,

427 A. 2d 872 (1980), cited by appellant.

In the present case Miss Scharf went out of her way to attempt to
obtain a high price for the equipment.

She advertised in newspapers,

attempted to have appellant and his sons find a buyer; and contacted
numerous

dealers

in

Salt Lake City,

Denver,

and

Albuquerque and

several of her customers in the machine tool industry who were sellers
of such equipment.

To obtain

a higher net

return,

she

set about

selling the equipment herself in order to avoid the costs incident

tu

placing

an

the

auctioneer.

machinery

in

a

dealer's

place

of

ur

with

She sold the machinery at a higher price than that for
- 18 -

"·h1ch it had been appraised by responsible equipment dealers; and she
.>;ave to appellant reasonable notice of the date after which the property
would be sold
them.

There is no evidence that the Ericksons, or any of

attempted to find a buyer for the machinery or that they could

have obtained a better price for the machinery.

Whether a sale has

been conducted in a commercially reasonable manner is a question of
fact, and the fact finder had before him ample of evidence from which
he could and did find that the sales were conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner.

II

THE LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 11, 1980, CONSTITUTED
REASONABLE NOTIFICATION TO APPELLANT OF THE DATE
AFTER WHICH THE PROPERTY WOULD BE SOLD.
The provisions for notification of a sale by a secured party are set
out in ?OA-9-504(3) Utah Code Annotated 1953:

* * *

Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline
speedily in value or is of a rype customarily sold on a
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and
place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time
after which any private sale or other intended disposition is
to be made sball be sent by the secured party to the debtor,

***
On

September 11,

1980,

Miss Scharf's

counsel

sent a letter to

appellant setting out the defaults and making a demand for full payment
of the indebtedness under the leases.

R

Erickson

BMG Corporation.

and

Bruce V.

Copies of the letter were sent to
Erickson,

the

principals

in

The next to the last paragraph of the letter read as

follows
- 19 -
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The equipment co,·erPd by the leaoes 1s nuw in tlH· fl"'"'·•,,, 1"n
of Western Leasing :md will be sulJ on Septcoml•e1 .\II. l'.J8iJ,
unless the amounto due under the lease agreement h,l\, IJeen
paid
If they have been p;JJJ, the leased equipment will IJe
turned over to you or to BMG Curpor;i t10n, if not, the sale
proceeds, after deduction of costs and expenses, will be
applied to the indebtedness and Western Leasing will look to
you and your co-guarantors for payment of the difference
The appellant takes the position that because the letter stated that
the property would be sold on September 30, 1980, instead of that it
would

be

sold

after

September 29,

1980,

the

notification

was

so

defective that it did not comply with the requirements of 70A-9-504(3)

Any reasonable reading of the letter would certainly suggest to the
reader that he had only through September 29, 1980, within which to
do something about finding a suitable buyer or a suitable price for the
equipment.

The validity of the notice has to be considered in light of the
purpose of such a notice.

This court discussed the notice requirement

in FMA Financial Corporation v. Pro-Printers, 590 P. 2d 803, 807 (Utah
1979):
The purpose of the notice requirement is for the protection of
the debtor, by permitting him to bid at the sale, or to
arrange for interested parties to bid, and to otherwise assure
that the sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable
manner.
The danger resulting from not notifyin.g the debtor
of the sale of secured property is that the property may be
sold for an amount unreasonably below its market value,
burdening the debtor with liability for the deficiency
Ironically, the notice requirement acts to the secured party's
advantage; if the debtor helps secure a higher sale µrir·e, the
secured
party
is
benefited,
because the prospect of
recoverying any deficiency is usually dubious
- 20 -

jl);1

I nat>much

at>

the sale in this case was a private sale, the only

r1<d1ce required was to let the debtor (and the guarantors) know the
date

after

which

the

property

would

be

sold.

In support of his

argument, appellant cites Liberty National Bank

Greiner,

62 OhioApp. 2d 125, 405 N E. 2d 317 (1978), to the effect that a notice
sunilar to the one given by Western Leasing was inherently misleading
and therefore did not constitute proper notice of a private sale.

The

brief quotes the following as the faulty notice to the debtor:

***

You are hereby given notice that the property
will be
sold on the tenth day after receipt of this letter at Fremont,
Ohio, and the minimum price for which the secured party may
be sold is $4, 000. 00. "
On this basis, it is argued,

the court found that the creditor's

letter had elem en ts of both notice of public sale and notice of private
sale.

But the appellant failed to quote the whole notice, and what was

left out was very material to the court's holding:
Any person may appear at the time and place of sale and bid
on said property.
It was that language that led the court to the conclusion that the

notice was patently ambiguous.

It had no problem with the fact that

the notice stated a specific date on which the sale would be held rather
than an "after" date

The court said:

A reading of the first quoted portion of the notice would
indicate that the vehicles were to be sold through a private
sale
The mformat10n therein conveyed, i.e., the date after
which the property would be sold, would satisfy the notice
requirements of R.C. 1309.47(C) for a private sale. The last
line of the notice letter, however, indicates that a public sale
with competitive bidding would be held.
Thus, aside from

- 21 -
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any other deficienq•. the notice was p;itentlv ;imLu;;u"th "
what type of sale would be held * * *

1.,

In the present case the notice did what it was supposed to do
Appellant knew how much time he had within which to find a buyer for
the equipment, or to make some other arrangments for its disposition
No time and place of sale was set out to give an indication to him that
he might be protected because the sale would be a public auction.

The

sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner and at any time
prior to September 30,

1980, he could have taken some steps to see

that a higher price, if obtainable, would be obtained.

Appellant's

position

is

not

supported

by Benton-Lincoln

Credit

Service, Inc. v. Giffin, 48 Ore.App. 559, 617 P.2d 662 (1980), cited in
his brief.

In that case the secured party notified the debtor only that

it intended to apply for a certificate of title and that immediate action
might

be

taken for recovering

repossession and other costs.

the indebtedness,

including costs of

The letter pointed out what remedies

were available to the secured party and that the exercise of the rights
might be avoided by paying the balance due.

Nowhere in the letter,

however, was it stated that the property would be sold.

The court said:
The letter sent to plaintiff did not serve the purpose of the
notice required by ORS 79. 5040(3). He was not informc:d that
the truck would be sold either at public sale at a given time:
and place or at private sale. but only that sale wa>o "among
the remedies reserved to the contract holder," ;rnd that he
- 22 -

must pay the balance due within ten days to avoid " * * *
t be exercise of these rights * * * ." The only action of
which he was notified was the secured party's intention to
apply for a certificate of title.
Citizens
( 1979),

State

Bank

'!_.

Sparks,

also cited by appellant,

202 Neb.

661,

276 N W. 2d 661

does not support his argument.

In

that case the only notice given to the debtor was that the property
would be repossessed, after which it would sold and the money would
be applied

to the note with the remaining balance, if any, taken to

small claims court.

There was no statement at all as to the time after

which the sale would be made.

In

Hertz

37 Conn. Sup.

Commercial

Leasing

7, 427 A. 2d 872, 876,

Corp.
(1980),

v.

Dynatron,

Inc.,

the notice given did not

specify whether it was a public or private sale.

It did meet all the

requirements of a public sale notice, but a public sale was not held.
The court decided the notice was ambiguous, misleading and confusing.
This is different from our case in that the notice was of a public sale.
It is arguable, though by no means clear, that when a debtor receives
notice that the sale is going to be a public sale he may assume that
competitive bidding will bring the highest price available and see no
reason to take other steps to protect himself.

That is not our case,

because the notice sent to appellant did not have the requirements for a
public sale notice

Neither time nor place was mentioned, and there

was no suggestion of receiving bids.
Inc.

y_

M

In Simmons Machinery Company,

M Brokerage, Inc., 409 So. 2d 743, 16 ABR 138, 33 UCC
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Rep. 419 (Ala. 1981), also relied upon bv appeJL111t. th'"

did n•>I

n<>lll''

state that the property would be sold
by the Alabama Supreme Court was that. "after
be

elgible

[sic]

for

resale "

The

Alabama

date
court

the dnll will

reg;irded

"tentative" and more of the nature of a demand for payment
case appellant was told that the

it

as

In our

would be sold.

Appellant correctly points out that in Associates Financial Services
Co. , Inc.

DiMarco, 383 A 2d 296 (Del. Superior Ct. 1978), the court

held that the notice of a private sale was not sufficient to support a
public sale that actually took place.

The notice had specified a private

sale but the secured party conducted a public sale.

In holding that

the notice was defective, the court said:

***

Here the notice specified no place of sale and stated the
items would be offered for sale "after 5.00 p.m on the [
* ] day of May, 1975 and day to day thereafter until sold."
This failed to specify a time of sale.
Finally the notice
specifically referred to private sale.
This of necessity had
the effect of eliminating the possibility of bidding by
defendant or any bidders whom he might have produced.
Clearly, an important function of a public sale notice is to
afford the debtor the opportunity to be present and bid at
the sale and also to encourage others to be present and bid.

**

***
The

case

conducted.

also

With

dealt

respect

with
to

notices

these

the

of

private

court

sales

noted

the

that

different

purposes of the two notices.

* * *

the objective of notice where a private sale is
contemplated is to afford a reasonable time within which the
debtor can protect his property by paying off the debt or by
finding a buyer for the property.
- 24 -

were

lll;i

::)pillers \1
400 N E 2d

First National Bank

Arenzville, 81 Ill App.3d 199,

1057 ( 1980), cited by appellant, involved two sales, notice

having been given with respect to only one of the items of equipment.
The court held that notice had to be given with respect to each sale.

Stewart \1. Taylor Chevrolet, Inc., 17 UCC Rep. 627 (S. D. Ohio
1975) the creditor gave notice that collateral was to be sold at a public
sale and the bankruptcy court held that the notice was invalid where
the property was not sold at a public sale but was sold at a private
sale.

The notice given in the present case, however, was not notice of

a public sale since there was no mention of the time or place of the
sale.

The Code does not require the notice to contain a statement that

the sale will be "public" or "private" if the nature of the sale can be
determined by the terms of the notice.

See All-States Leasing Co. v.

Ochs, 42 Or.App. 319, 600 P.2d 899, 906 (1979); DeLay First National
Bank v. Jacobsen Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 243 N.W.2d 745 (1976).

III

ANY INSUFFICIENCY IN THE FORM OF THE NOTICE DID
NOT RESULT IN INJURY TO THE APPELLANT.
Assuming

the

notice

was

not

sufficient

to

comply

with

the

provisions of the UCC, it does not follow that the lessor is foreclosed
from

recovering

a

deficiency

In

Pioneer

Dodge

Center,

Inc.

v.

Glaubensklee, 649 p. 2d 28, 29 (Utah 1982), Pioneer Dodge sent notice
to the debtor that a truck would be sold and that she could make her
- 25 -

40a

bid on April 30,

1916,

Pioneer· fJodgP

at

at

11

m

l111 .1

defended against a deficiency iudgment on the gr"und

c1nH>ng otlwrs

that the notice was not adequate m that the sale of the truck occurned
at

10.00 a.m.

instead

of

11.00 a m

The

court

disposed

of

this

argument by saying:
On the facts of this case, defendant cannot claim any benefit
from the error in the notice of sale
Although the auction
actually commenced at 10 00 on the day specified defendant
did not appear at 11 00 a m., the time stated in the
notification. Because defendant took no action -- indeed, did
not even appear personally -- to protect her interest in the
sale at the later time stated in the notice to her, she was not
prejudiced by the error in the designation of the hour of
sale.
See,

also Zions

First National Bank v.

Hurst,

570 P. 2d

1031,

1033

(Utah 1977)

Vernon
Glaubensklee.
property

was

Erickson

is

Although

in
he

to be sold,

much
was

he

the

notified

took no

same
of

steps

position

the

day on

as

Marlene

which

the

to make a bid for the

property himself, to arrange for other financing, to attempt to re-lease
the property, or to find a buyer for it.

Appellant acknowledged receiving the letter of September 11. 1980
But he didn't do much to protect his interest.

He testified that

After I received the letter I worked with Tan-Dem trymg
to -- or they worked with Tan-Dem trying to get them to sell
it. And I didn't do too much any more than that, other than
I figured when the 30th came, why, I would hear what we
could do to maybe buy it or work -- get somebody there to
buy it when the sale was taking place. ( R. 192)
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In

addition

debtors,

to

having

Miss Scharf

the

called

notice
appellant

of September 11 sent to the
on

the

telephone.

On

September 30, 1980, she called him by telephone and told him Tan-Dem
Machinery had made the highest bid of $17, 000 for the shear and that
she was willing to accept that because that was the highest bid she
could obtain, whereupon appellant said, "Fine."

It is of some importance that the sale took place after the lessor,

Miss Scharf, had for weeks been trying to cooperate with the Ericksons
in getting someone to purchase the machine or enter into a new lease
for it,

and during all that time they had been unable to accomplish

anything.

Not only was appellant not injured by the failure to receive

proper notice of the sale, when he was called about, he acquiesced in
the sale at a price $2 ,000 lower than that for which it was ultimately
sold.

CONCLUSION
The trial court after hearing all of the evidence, found that the
sale was commercially reasonable and that the notice was adequate to
advise the appellant of the date after which a private sale would be
made.

There was abundant evidence to support the findings,
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be affirmed
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